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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
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_____________ 
 
No. 12-2642 
_____________ 
 
RONALD DRAZIN; individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated; 
RONALD SEDLAK; individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated; 
BRUCE H. NAGEL 
                                                 
v. 
 
HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF NEW JERSEY, INC.; 
MEGELLAN HEALTH SERVICES INC.; GREEN SPRING HEALTH SERVICES, 
INC., MEGELLAN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH NEW JERSEY, LLC 
 
     *Mazie Slater Katz and Freeman, LLC, 
                                                                   Appellant 
 
     *(Pursuant to Rule 12(a) Fed. R. App. P.) 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 2-06-cv-06219) 
District Judge:  Hon. Faith S. Hochberg 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 30, 2013 
 
Before:   JORDAN, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 11, 2013) 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Mazie Slater Katz & Freeman, LLC (“Mazie Slater”) appeals from an opinion and 
order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey which denied its 
application for attorneys‟ fees and reimbursement of its expenses.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 This dispute arises out of the settlement and dismissal of several related class 
action lawsuits filed by rival law firms.  In November 2006, attorney David Mazie filed a 
class action (the “Beye Action”) against Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey 
(“Horizon”) seeking damages and injunctive relief under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002 et seq., based on Horizon‟s 
alleged failure to provide health insurance coverage for the treatment of eating disorders.  
The following month, attorney Bruce Nagel of Nagel Rice, LLP (“Nagel Rice”) filed this 
action (the “Drazin Action”) against Horizon on similar grounds.  Shortly thereafter, 
Nagel Rice filed a virtually identical class action against Aetna, Inc. (the “DeVito 
Action”).   
 In September 2006, shortly before the filing of those actions, Mazie prepared to 
leave what was then the law firm of Nagel Rice & Mazie LLP.  He filed the Beye Action 
during the “phase-out” period before starting his own firm, Mazie Slater, in January 
2007.  Before filing the Drazin and DeVito Actions, Nagel wrote to Mazie suggesting that 
they work together on a single case against Horizon, but Mazie declined.  Due to personal 
animosity between Mazie and Nagel, the competing cases against Horizon proceeded 
 3 
 
separately in the District Court, although then-Magistrate Judge Shwartz
1
 ordered that 
there be some cooperation between the two firms in an attempt to reduce duplicative 
discovery demands.    
 In October 2008, the District Court approved a settlement in the DeVito Action 
that included reimbursement of past denied claims for treatment of eating disorders and 
Aetna‟s agreement not to apply coverage limitations to future claims.  Although Mazie 
Slater did not represent any of the DeVito plaintiffs, it opposed that settlement in a letter 
to the District Court, and one of the firm‟s attorneys appeared at the preliminary approval 
hearing and stated that his firm would not settle the Beye Action on the terms agreed 
upon in DeVito.  The following month, Nagel Rice and the Drazin defendants informed 
the Court that they had reached a settlement of that action (the “Class Settlement”) 
modeled on the settlement in the DeVito Action.  The Class Settlement was the result of 
negotiations between Nagel Rice and counsel for the Drazin Defendants, and Mazie 
Slater was not involved in those negotiations.  Magistrate Judge Shwartz granted Mazie 
Slater leave to apply for appointment as lead counsel if the firm and the Beye plaintiffs 
decided not to support the Class Settlement and to continue to litigate, but Mazie Slater 
did not do so.
2
 
                                              
1
 On April 10, 2013, Judge Shwartz was sworn in as a member of this Court.  
2
 That is not to say that Mazie Slater did nothing.  The firm filed several motions 
to enforce purported side agreements between it and Nagel Rice concerning fees and 
publicity relating to the class actions, a “cross-motion” to add the Beye plaintiffs as class 
representatives in the Drazin Action, and a motion to strike a provision from the Class 
Settlement which it claimed was unconstitutional.  Magistrate Judge Shwartz denied or 
otherwise terminated those motions.  Mazie Slater then requested an indefinite 
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 The District Court approved the Class Settlement after a final fairness hearing in 
April 2008.   Of the 566 class members, two opted out and none objected.  Mazie Slater 
did not object to final approval of the Class Settlement, although it did publicly criticize it 
as the result of a “reverse auction” in which Nagel Rice accepted a lesser settlement than 
it should have, the implication being that Nagel Rice had “sold out” the class members.  
Drazin v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 432, 438 (D.N.J. 
2011).  After the Class Settlement was approved, Mazie Slater filed a stipulation of 
dismissal in the Beye action because it no longer had a client who wished to litigate.   
 At that point, the dispute over attorneys‟ fees began.  Nagel Rice sought an award 
of $2.45 million, the maximum amount permitted under the Class Settlement.  Mazie 
Slater sought an allocation of 50 percent of any counsel fees awarded to Nagel Rice plus 
reimbursement of all of its litigation-related expenses.  The District Court permitted 
further briefing on the fee issue and held an evidentiary hearing.  The Court concluded 
that Nagel Rice, as counsel who had achieved the successful result for the Class, was 
entitled to reasonable fees based on a lodestar calculation,
3
 and it assigned a Special 
Master to calculate and recommend the appropriate fee.  Based on the Special Master‟s 
report, the Court awarded $2,196,580 in fees and $112,506 in expenses to Nagel Rice.  
                                                                                                                                                  
adjournment of preliminary approval of the Class Settlement.  That request was also 
denied.   
3
 A court determines the lodestar for a fee application by “multiplying the number 
of hours ... [the attorneys] reasonably worked on a client‟s case by a reasonable hourly 
billing rate for such services,” taking into account various factors.  Gunter v. Ridgewood 
Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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The Court determined that Mazie Slater was entitled to nothing because it made no 
contribution to, and had in fact opposed, the Class Settlement.   
This timely appeal followed. 
II. Discussion
4
 
“Our case law makes clear that ... the amount of a fee award is within the district 
court‟s discretion so long as it employs correct standards and procedures and makes 
findings of fact not clearly erroneous.”  Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 
329 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  Mazie Slater argues that the District Court applied the 
wrong legal standard and that the factual findings to which it applied that standard were 
erroneous.  Neither of those arguments has merit.
5
 
                                              
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “This Court reviews the 
District Court‟s decision whether to award attorneys‟ fees for abuse of discretion, but 
exercises plenary review over the lower court‟s application of legal standards in making 
that determination.”  United States ex rel. Bogart v. King Pharms., 493 F.3d 323, 328 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  “Absent error of law, determination of the reasonableness of the fee is for the 
district court … .”  Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1983). 
5
 Mazie Slater also contends that it was entitled to a fee award under the “common 
fund doctrine” due to the time and effort it devoted to the Beye Action.  The common 
fund doctrine “provides that a private plaintiff, or plaintiff‟s attorney, whose efforts 
create, discover, increase, or preserve a fund to which others have a claim, is entitled to 
recover from the fund the costs of his litigation, including attorneys‟ fees.”  In re Gen. 
Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 789, 820 n.39 (3d Cir. 
1995).  In common fund cases, “the plaintiff class as a whole rather than the defendant 
bears the burden of attorney‟s fees.”  Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 
2000).  This is not a common fund case because, under the terms of the Class Settlement, 
the defendants, not the class, were required to pay an award of attorneys‟ fees up to an 
agreed-upon cap.  Even if the common fund doctrine were applicable, Mazie Slater 
would not be entitled to a fee award, since the District Court found that the firm did not 
contribute in any manner to the Class Settlement negotiated by Nagel Rice. 
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 “Under what has been denominated the „American Rule‟ for payment of fees, the 
prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys‟ fee from the 
loser,” and, “[i]nstead, attorneys are paid pursuant to contract with their clients.”  Brytus 
v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
However, there is a “widespread exception” to the American Rule, id. at 242, under the 
many statutes that shift the payment of one party‟s legal fees to the other.  “The ERISA 
statutory fee provision is such a congressional enactment,” id., and it provides that “the 
court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney‟s fee and costs of action to either 
party,” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).   
Although ERISA does not limit a fee award to the prevailing party, the Supreme 
Court noted in Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. that “a fees claimant must 
show some degree of success on the merits before a court may award attorney‟s fees 
under § 1132(g)(1).”  130 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“A claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving trivial success on the merits or 
a purely procedural victory ... .”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the 
Drazin Action was brought primarily under ERISA, the District Court correctly 
concluded that this is a fee-shifting case.
6
  Consequently, the Court assessed whether 
Mazie Slater had achieved “some degree of success” on the merits on behalf of the 
                                              
6
 As a result of its determination that this is a fee-shifting case, the District Court 
also employed the lodestar method in calculating the actual fees awarded in connection 
with the Class Settlement.  Mazie Slater does not contest the actual fee calculation. 
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Drazin Class by litigating the duplicative Beye Action.  It answered that question in the 
negative and denied the firm‟s request for attorneys‟ fees.  
Mazie Slater argues that Hardt is inapplicable because it dealt solely with one 
individual claimant seeking fees under a fee-shifting statute and not with the allocation 
among law firms of a single amount awarded as a result of a fee shift in a class action.   It 
is true that, “[i]n a class action settlement, the district court has an independent duty ... to 
the class and the public to ensure that attorneys‟ fees are reasonable and divided up fairly 
among plaintiffs‟ counsel.”  In re High Sulphur Content Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 
F.3d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 2008).  And a proper allocation should reflect the relative 
contribution that the various plaintiffs‟ firms made to the successful outcome of the 
litigation.  See In re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire 
Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 308 (1st Cir.1995) (approving a district court‟s allocation of fees paid 
out of a settlement fund based on an analysis “emphasizing the attorneys‟ relative 
contribution to the creation of the Fund” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1974) (listing “[t]he time 
and labor required” and “the results obtained” as factors in determining a fee award).  
The District Court‟s application of Hardt was entirely consistent with those 
principles.  The Court observed that “Mazie Slater litigated its duplicative Beye action 
parallel to the Drazin action and did not succeed in its efforts for the Class[] ... .”  Drazin, 
832 F. Supp. 2d at 442.  The Court‟s conclusion that Mazie Slater did not achieve “some 
degree of success on the merits” as required by Hardt is the same as concluding that the 
firm made no “relative contribution” to the Class Settlement.  Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d 
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at 308.  Thus, the Court did not abuse its discretion in relying on Hardt‟s measure of 
whether an award of fees is warranted in the first instance to determine whether an 
allocation of fees to a particular plaintiffs‟ firm is fair under the circumstances. 
Mazie Slater also challenges the District Court‟s factual determination that “Mazie 
Slater did not win a dispositive motion, nor win its case, nor negotiate a settlement for its 
clients in the Beye action.”  Drazin, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 443.  “We must not disturb the 
factual findings of the District Court unless [they are] clearly erroneous.”  Lanning v. 
SEPTA, 181 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1999).  That is particularly true in the context of 
awards of attorneys‟ fees, “in view of the district court‟s superior understanding of the 
litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are 
factual matters.”  Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting 
Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Here, it is undisputed that Mazie Slater neither won its case nor negotiated a settlement 
for its clients. It had no involvement in the settlement discussions with Horizon and filed 
a stipulation of dismissal in the Beye action after those discussions were successfully 
concluded by Nagel Rice.  And the only motion that Mazie Slater “won” on behalf of the 
Beye plaintiffs was its partial defeat of Horizon‟s motion to dismiss, which came six 
months after the District Court had already denied Horizon‟s motion to dismiss the 
DeVito Action on essentially the same grounds.  We therefore cannot say that the District 
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Court‟s finding that Mazie Slater achieved no success for its clients was erroneous, let 
alone clearly so.
7
 
III. Conclusion 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s order concerning attorneys‟ fees. 
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 Mazie Slater also argues that Judge Hochberg should be disqualified from 
presiding over any further proceedings in this matter or in future matters in which Mazie 
Slater represents one of the parties.  The argument for recusal is utterly frivolous and 
warrants no further comment.     
